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Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 
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Abstract 
The loan bills temporary credit facility was first implemented in May 2008, before the Global 
Financial Crisis had truly hit Denmark. It continued to be utilized as part of a broader effort 
to increase interbank lending after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The 
objective of the loan bills scheme was to facilitate lending among financial institutions. Each 
week, loan bills could be pledged as collateral for a seven-day loan from Denmark’s central 
bank, Danmarks Nationalbank. One banking institution could borrow from another 
institution by issuing a loan bill, and the institution buying the bill could raise liquidity by 
using it as collateral for a loan from Danmarks Nationalbank. The buying institution could 
also count the loan bill toward its statutory liquidity, as required by section 152 of the Danish 
Financial Business Act. While reports show that the program may have helped improve 
money market liquidity for some financial institutions, loan bills were not widely used. On 
February 26, 2011, the credit facility for loan bills expired. 
Keywords: Denmark, loan bill, temporary credit facility 
  
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to market liquidity programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 









At a Glance  
The loan bills temporary credit facility was first 
implemented in May 2008, before the Global Financial 
Crisis had truly hit Denmark, and continued to be 
utilized during the interbank market freeze after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. The objective of the loan 
bills scheme was to facilitate lending among the 
institutions. Each week, loan bills could be pledged as 
collateral for a seven-day loan from Denmark’s central 
bank, Danmarks Nationalbank. A bank or mortgage 
credit institute could borrow from another institution 
by issuing a loan bill, and the institution buying the bill 
could raise liquidity by using it as collateral for a loan 
from Danmarks Nationalbank. The buying institution 
could also count the loan bill toward its statutory 
liquidity, as required by section 152 of the Danish 
Financial Business Act. 
Summary Evaluation 
While reports show that the program may have 
helped improve money market liquidity for some 
financial institutions, loan bills were not widely used. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and others 
have gone so far as to consider the loan bills scheme a 
failure in addressing the needs of the Danish banking 
sector. However, both the Danish government and critics agree that the lack of usage of 
temporary credit facilities in Denmark was in part due to the more successful and more 
widely used bank rescue packages that guaranteed interbank loans, five months later.  
  
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To facilitate lending amongst financial 
institutions to support liquidity for banks 
Announcement 
Date   
May 23, 2008 
Operational Date May 23, 2008 
End of Issuance 
Window 
May 21, 2009 
(initial) 
Sep. 30, 2010 (second) 
Feb. 26, 2011 (final) 
Legal Authority N/A 
Peak Utilization DKK 6 billion ($1 billion) 
in loan bills issued; little 
to no borrowing against 
loan bills (exact number 
pending) 
Participants Several (exact number 
pending) 
Administrators Danmarks Nationalbank 
Denmark Loan Bills 
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Loan Bills Temporary Credit Facility:  Denmark Context 
 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in 
LCU converted to USD) 
 
 
$355.62 billion in 2008 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
GDP per capita  
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in 
LCU converted to USD) 
 
$64,322 per capita in 2008 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Sovereign credit rating (5-
year senior debt) 
 






Size of banking system 
 
 
$750.5 billion in total assets 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Size of banking system as 
a percentage of GDP 
 
211.04% in 2008 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Size of banking system as 
a percentage of financial 
system 
 
Data not available for given year 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
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5-bank concentration of 
banking system 
 
89% of total banking assets in 2008 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
 
Foreign involvement in 
banking system 
18% of total banking assets in 2008 
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database 
 
Government ownership of 
banking system 
 
1% of banks owned by the state in 2008 
Source: Call et al. “Bank Ownership – Trends and 
Implications” 
Existence of deposit 
insurance 
100% insurance on deposits up to $133,333 in 2010 









I.  Overview 
Background 
The loan bills temporary credit facility was first implemented in May 2008, before the Global 
Financial Crisis and the interbank market freeze had truly hit Denmark. Confidence among 
the institutions was still relatively high. However, financial institutions had become more 
reluctant to lend to each other. Observing this phenomenon, Denmark’s central bank—
Danmarks Nationalbank—chose to approve a new type of security, the loan bill, as eligible 
collateral for loans at the central bank.  
This marked the first time Danmarks Nationalbank’s framework for credit operations was 
adjusted in response to the Global Financial Crisis; however, it would be followed by more 
changes in the next few months. During the interbank market freeze of September 2008, 
Danmarks Nationalbank used additional monetary policy instruments to increase market 
liquidity. These included adding a second temporary credit facility (the excess-capital 
temporary credit facility, also known as the solvency scheme) and an expansion of the 
collateral base to include more securities than were normally eligible as collateral for loans 
from Danmarks Nationalbank.3 These steps were taken to “prevent solvent banks from 
experiencing difficulties due to insufficient liquidity” (Financial Stability 2009, 1st Half, 18). 
By the end of October 2008, the government would guarantee all bank liabilities, including 
borrowing in the interbank market. 
Program Description 
The objective of the loan bills scheme was to facilitate lending among institutions. Every 
Friday, loan bills could be pledged as collateral for a seven-day loan from Danmarks 
Nationalbank. One banking institution could borrow from another institution by issuing a 
loan bill, and the institution buying the bill could raise liquidity by using it as collateral for a 
loan from Danmarks Nationalbank. The buying institution could also count the loan bill 
toward its statutory liquidity, as required by section 152 of the Danish Financial Business 
Act.  
The introduction of loan bills was followed by the temporary expansion of the accepted 
collateral base for loans from Danmarks Nationalbank to banking institutions and mortgage-
credit institutes. The loan bills had to meet Danmarks Nationalbank’s standard terms. These 
included requiring that loan bills were zero-coupon securities issued by banking institutions 
in the Kingdom of Denmark. In addition, the maximum maturity for loan bills was set at one 
year. The loan bills also had to be issued with VP Securities, Denmark’s central securities 
depository, as the account controller. The collateral value was calculated as the nominal 
value of the bills minus a haircut of 10 percent.  
Initially, the interest rate for lending against loan bills was fixed as Danmarks Nationalbank’s 
usual lending rate plus one percentage point. On October 7, 2008, the interest rate for loan 
bills at Danmarks Nationalbank was changed to Danmarks Nationalbank’s usual lending rate 
 
3 During the financial crisis, the collateral base for loans from Danmarks Nationalbank to financial institutions 
was temporarily expanded to include special loan bills, quoted and unquoted shares, investment fund shares, 
bank bonds with government guarantee, as well as SPV bonds issued on the basis of government-guaranteed 
loans to the institutions (Financial Stability 2010, 66). 
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plus two percentage points. The purpose of this adjustment was to align the terms and 
conditions with the other temporary credit facilities. On March 13, 2009, the interest rate 
was reduced to Danmarks Nationalbank’s usual lending rate plus one percentage point, a 
decision influenced by a downward trend in interest rates overall. On July 17, 2009, loan bills 
were included in the temporary collateral basis, and the interest rate was abolished. The 
purpose was to align the terms and conditions for pledging of unquoted unsecured debt with 
government guarantees and loan bills. 
The loan bills credit facility was initially set to expire on May 21, 2009. On November 11, 
2008, the credit facility for loan bills was extended until September 30, 2010. The purpose 
of this adjustment was to align the expiry dates of the temporary credit facilities. In April 
2010, the temporary expansion of collateral basis (including loan bills) was extended to 
February 26, 2011. On February 26, 2011, the credit facility for loan bills expired.  
Outcomes 
Loan bills were not widely issued. A 2009 Financial Stability report showed low issuance in 
the facilities’ initial year of operation. Between DKK25 and DKK30 billion in loan bills were 
issued overall; issuance peaked in October 2008, when about DKK16 billion were issued. 
(See Figure 1) At the end of April 2009, Danish banking institutions had issued a total of 
DKK6 billion in loan bills to other institutions (21).  
Also by April 2009, no institutions had borrowed against loan bills from the central bank. 
The 2009 report notes that this was part of a broader trend where securities eligible as part 
of the temporary expanded collateral base were not used. Although the temporary facilities 
(and corresponding expanded collateral policies) were supposed to help Danish institutions 
meet liquidity requirements through alternative collateral, the use of these unconventional 
collateral types was limited. Usual eligible assets continued to account for the vast majority 




















Figure 1: Comparison of securities by issuance types (loan bills in bright orange).  
 
 
Source: Financial Stability 2010, p. 65  
 
The Danish government attributed this relative lack of temporary-credit-facilities usage to 
the success of the Original Guarantee Scheme under Bank Package I. As a result of Bank 
Rescue Package I, which guaranteed interbank loans, the “banking institutions started 
lending to each other in the money market again” and the “need to borrow from Danmarks 
Nationalbank [became] modest” (Financial Stability 2009, 1st Half, 21).  
After the temporary expansion of collateral (including loan bills) expired in February 2011, 
a partial reintroduction of the temporary collateral expansion was put into place on August 
10, 2011. It allowed banks and mortgage-credit institutes to pledge certain shares in jointly 
owned corporations as collateral with Danmarks Nationalbank. This new temporary 
expansion of collateral expired on July 1, 2014. 
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II. Key Design Decisions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
1. May 23, 2008, Danmarks Nationalbank established its first temporary credit 
facility in response to the Global Financial Crisis via the creation of loan bills.  
Danmarks Nationalbank created this credit facility by expanding the collateral basis to 
include a new type of security, the loan bill, which could be pledged as collateral to Danmarks 
Nationalbank for loans on a weekly basis. Banks and mortgage-credit institutes were eligible 
to participate in this seven-day loan.  
2. The interest rate for the loan bills facility varied over time.  
The interest rate was initially fixed as Danmarks Nationalbank’s usual lending rate plus one 
percentage point. On October 7, 2008, the interest rate for loan bills at Danmarks 
Nationalbank changed to Danmarks Nationalbank’s usual lending rate plus two percentage 
points. The purpose of this adjustment was to align the terms and conditions for all of 
Denmark’s temporary credit facilities (the loan bills facility, the excess-capital facility, and 
the other temporary expansion of collateral basis). On March 13, 2009, the interest rate was 
reduced to Danmarks Nationalbank’s usual lending rate plus one percentage point. A general 
downward trend in interest rates influenced this decision. On July 17, 2009, loan bills were 
included in the temporary collateral basis, and the interest was abolished. 
3. The collateral value of loan bills was calculated as the nominal value of the bills 
minus a haircut of 10 percent.  
4. The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority permitted loan bills to be included 
as part of an institution’s statutory liquidity.  
Because the institution buying the loan bill could later raise liquidity by using it as collateral 
for a loan from Danmarks Nationalbank, the buying institution was permitted to include the 
bill in its statutory liquidity under Section 152 of the Danish Financial Business Act, until one 
month before the expiry of the facility. 
5. The expiration date for the loan bills facility was extended twice. 
The loan bills credit facility was initially set to expire on May 21, 2009. On November 11, 
2008, the credit facility for loan bills was extended until September 30, 2010. The purpose 
of this adjustment was to align the expiry dates of the temporary credit facilities. In April 
2010, the option of pledging loan bills as collateral was extended to February 26, 2011.  
III. Evaluation  
The central bank said that the purpose of the loan bills facility was to spur interbank lending 
rather than inject central bank liquidity: “Extensive use of the credit facility was not a 
criterion of success” (Overview of Temporary Facilities, 1). Roughly DKK25-30 billion in loan 
bills were issued in 2008-09. The IMF and other observers concluded that loan bills were not 
widely used (Carstensen 2011, 108). In September 2008, just a few months after the loan 
bills scheme was first implemented, the government created the excess-capital facility in 
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part because of the failure of the loan-bill scheme to meet banking needs that were 
intensified after the fall of Lehman Brothers. In October, the government guaranteed bank 
debt, including interbank debt, obviating the need for the program. 
A 2009 report from Danmarks Nationalbank elaborates on its disappointment with the 
program, noting that the loan-bill scheme “assume[d] that the banking institutions want to 
lend to each other,” however, “confidence among the banking institutions weakened during 
the summer of 2008 as the scope of the problems in the financial sector became more 
apparent” (Financial Stability 2009, 1st Half, 19). The purpose of the excess-capital facility 
in particular was to prevent banking institutions with adequate capital from incurring 
liquidity problems as a result of insufficient assets, which could be pledged as collateral to 
Danmarks Nationalbank. Unlike the loan-bill scheme, the excess-capital scheme was meant 
to help institutions access loans raised directly from Danmarks Nationalbank—not from 
other banks. To achieve this, the excess-capital facility allowed Danmarks Nationalbank to 
offer uncollateralised credit in the form of credit line, the value of which depended on the 
applying institutions’ excess capital adequacy (Financial Stability 2009, 1st Half, 20). The 
credit line could be counted toward the institution’s statutory liquidity requirement 
(Financial Stability 2010, 66). 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has noted that the loan bills scheme was 
unsuccessful in part because “it failed to address banks’ strong liquidity preference and 
aversion to counterparty risk” (IMF 2008, 12-13). Others have argued that the temporary 
credit facilities in general had limited usage because Denmark was simultaneously 
experiencing a currency crisis. The combination of not being a Eurozone member and having 
a fixed exchange rate regime may have led to high demand for euro and dollar liquidity by 
Danish banks, and increasing pressure on the Danish krone (Woll 2014, 158). As a result, 
monetary policy instruments used by the Danish central bank had less of an impact on the 
banking industry than the instruments used in the United States or UK (Woll 2014, 158). The 
Danish government has also attributed this relative lack of temporary-credit-facilities usage 
to the success of the Original Guarantee Scheme under Bank Package I. They argue that as a 
result of Bank Rescue Package I, the “banking institutions started lending to each other in 
the money market again” and the “need to borrow from Danmarks Nationalbank [became] 
modest” (Financial Stability 2009 1st half, 21).   
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